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Note 
 
When Sosa Meets Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in 
Human Rights Litigation 
Jordan D. Shepherd∗ 
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim by a 
Mexican national against U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 
agents and other defendants under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS), which provides federal jurisdiction over tort claims by 
aliens.1 The plaintiff argued that the ATS provided U.S. courts 
with subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and remedy his claim 
for arbitrary detention in violation of international law.2 The 
Court did not agree, but neither did it disagree. Although the 
Court found that his particular claim did not implicate a cog-
nizable norm of customary international law,3 it saw no “reason 
. . . to shut the door” for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over certain common-law causes of action pleaded under the 
ATS.4 The Court’s holding validated almost twenty-five years of 
human rights case law that has been used to hold individual 
and corporate violators accountable for human rights norms.5 
 
∗  J.D. May 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 2006, Texas 
Tech University. For tremendous support and encouragement throughout law 
school, I sincerely thank Professors Jennifer Green, David Weissbrodt, and 
Duane Krohnke. I appreciate the dedication of the Editors and Staff of the 
Minnesota Law Review, especially Nadia Aboussir, Joe Hansen, and Laura 
Arneson. I dedicate this Note to Jennifer Neal Heuss: without you, none of this 
would be possible. Copyright © 2011 by Jordan D. Shepherd. 
 1. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (2006). While courts have also used the terms “Alien Tort Claims Act” 
and “Alien Tort Act,” most courts—and this Note—now use “Alien Tort Stat-
ute.” See Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 
104, 113 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining the development and citing cases). 
 2. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697. 
 3. Id. at 738. 
 4. Id. at 731. 
 5. See Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human 
Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Ad-
vocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 169, 
170 (2005) (discussing the line of cases that began with Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
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While many procedural and substantive issues remain unre-
solved, courts continue to recognize causes of action for torture 
and other human rights violations in the global effort to end 
impunity.6 
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim by a 
Pakistani national against John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller, 
the United States’ top law enforcement officials at the time.7 
Bringing a Bivens8 action for unconstitutional racial and reli-
gious discrimination by government officials, the plaintiff al-
leged that these defendants had designed and implemented a 
policy intended to discriminate against Arab-Muslims in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11.9 The Court extended its Bell At-
lantic v. Twombly plausibility standard10 to reject his allega-
tions as “conclusory” and dismiss his claims as not “plausi-
ble.”11 In a move widely interpreted as a major overhaul of the 
U.S. system of notice pleading,12 the Court granted the defend-
ants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint and appar-
ently adopted heightened pleading standards in “‘all civil ac-
tions.’”13 
Taken together, these two Supreme Court decisions have 
specific implications in human rights litigation. First, the hold-
ing of Sosa on subject-matter jurisdiction has set a high thresh-
old for courts to hear cases seeking to hold human rights viola-
tors accountable for their actions in U.S. courts.14 Following the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on judicial discretion in that case,15 
litigants progressively have faced and surmounted a number of 
procedural and substantive hurdles in applying the modern 
 
 6. Id. at 224–26. 
 7. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 8. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 9. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942–43. 
 10. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 11. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51. 
 12. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: 
A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 850–51 (2010) 
(retracting his pre-Iqbal interpretation of Twombly). 
 13. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 14. See generally Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is 
Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 
551 (2004) (discussing challenges and noting the “cautious approach” to recog-
nizing actionable norms found in Sosa and in most lower courts). 
 15. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (requiring federal 
courts to exercise “a restrained conception of . . . discretion” in recognizing 
causes of action under the ATS). 
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ATS.16 Subsequently, Iqbal’s revision of pleading standards in 
civil litigation creates a potential procedural barrier to ATS 
suits seeking to vindicate the rights of victims of egregious hu-
man rights violations. For ATS claims, like the discrimination 
claim in Iqbal,17 discovery is a vital tool to obtain evidence that 
is beyond the control of plaintiffs. In the pre-Iqbal world of civil 
litigation, pleadings were the first, simple step to move a case 
to the fact-bound inquiries of discovery.18 Following the Court’s 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to re-
quire a plausible statement of the claim for relief, many plain-
tiffs may be caught in a “catch 22.” To reach discovery and the 
factual evidence needed to substantiate the claim, a plaintiff 
must file a well-pleaded complaint; yet after Iqbal, a complaint 
is only well-pleaded if it already reflects factual material that 
may be obtainable only through discovery.19 It seems the 
movement to bring human rights violators to justice must clear 
a burdensome procedural hurdle.20 
This Note considers the effects on human rights litigation 
under the ATS of the Supreme Court’s new statement on plead-
ing standards in Iqbal. Part I describes the development of the 
ATS, as well as that of pleading standards in U.S. civil litiga-
tion. Part II analyzes ATS motions to dismiss in light of the 
new pleading standard, focusing on the variety of ways differ-
ent jurisdictions have approached plausibility pleading in ATS 
cases. It considers courts’ recognition (or lack thereof) of the 
distinction between jurisdictional motions to dismiss under 
 
 16. Joseph T. McLaughlin & Justin H. Bell, Mass Litigation: New Limita-
tions on the Exercise of Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY, SN066 ALI-ABA 199, 209–16 (2008) (discussing doctrines 
and citing cases). 
 17. Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal at 18–19, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 
07-1015) (discussing the Second Circuit’s receptivity toward “cabined” discovery). 
 18. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabiliz-
ing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824–26 (2010) (giving the historical back-
ground of pleadings). 
 19. Brief for National Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 10, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015) (expanding 
this argument and giving examples from civil rights cases). 
 20. In the context of civil rights suits, this problem is well known. See, 
e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley 
Era, 52 HOW. L.J. 99 (2008) (analyzing the early effects of Twombly on civil 
rights claims). Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill immediately after the 
Court decided Iqbal in an attempt to counter the effects of that decision. See 
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). Repre-
sentative Jerrold Nadler introduced a similar bill in the House. See Open 
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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Rule 12(b)(1) and merits-based challenges under Rule 12(b)(6) 
along with their respective standards of review. Part III finds 
that the broad similarities between the Court’s policy justifica-
tions in Sosa and Twombly-Iqbal support the narrow applica-
tion of the former to Rule 12(b)(1) motions and the latter to 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions. This Note concludes that this narrow 
approach, found more clearly in the case law of the Second Cir-
cuit rather than the Eleventh, adequately balances the needs of 
plaintiffs and defendants in Rule 12 motions in human rights 
litigation. 
I.  SOSA’S HISTORICAL PARADIGM TEST AND IQBAL’S 
PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD   
To set the backdrop for the discussion of pleading stand-
ards in ATS cases, this Part develops in two sections. The first 
section begins by describing the development of human rights 
litigation—from the enactment of the ATS in 1789, through the 
seminal case of Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,21 to the Supreme 
Court’s only comprehensive analysis of the statute in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain.22 It then expounds Sosa’s test for ATS sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction and, finally, reviews how courts have 
applied that test. The next section considers pleading stand-
ards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and whether 
the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal heightened those 
pleading standards. This overview—first, of ATS litigation, and 
second, of pleading standards—lays the groundwork for an 
analysis of the unique interaction of Sosa and Twombly-Iqbal 
in understanding the plausibility standard in human rights lit-
igation. 
A. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT 
Enacted in the First Judiciary Act of 1789, Judge Friendly 
once dubbed the ATS a “legal Lohengrin.”23 It is now a key fed-
eral statute in the transnational struggle to end impunity for 
human rights violators.24 This overview of the historical devel-
 
 21. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 22. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 23. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that 
“no one seems to know whence it came”). 
 24. Other important federal laws are the Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)), 
and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)). 
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opment of litigation under the ATS and its current scope under 
Sosa contextualizes its role in federal motion practice today. 
Understanding the relationship between subject-matter juris-
diction and stating a claim for relief is important to this Note’s 
analysis of the plausibility standard in ATS litigation. 
1. The Development of the ATS 
In its current form, the ATS provides that “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.”25 Since its enactment by 
the First Congress, the statute has not undergone major revi-
sion.26 Reading the amendments as superficial rather than 
substantive,27 the Sosa Court interpreted the statute as a 
product of the paradigms of the late eighteenth century.28  
In practice, the ATS lay dormant in the U.S. Code for most 
of its existence.29 A human rights lawsuit filed in 1979 on be-
half of the Filártiga family of Paraguay revived the ATS.30 The 
Second Circuit in 1980 allowed a civil claim for damages aris-
ing out of allegations of torture and extrajudicial killing of Joe-
lito Filártiga by a Paraguayan police official who was a political 
opponent of the young man’s father.31 In Filártiga, the court 
recognized that the ATS provided jurisdiction to hear the 
 
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 26. The minor, cosmetic changes were of two types. The first type of 
change reflected the phraseological development of the federal rules. See Wil-
liam R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Commit-
ted in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 468 n.4 (1986) 
(indicating that “causes” in the original Act was changed to “suits” then “civil 
action”). The second change concerns the removal of explicit reference to con-
current state jurisdiction. Id. (noting that this does not eliminate state juris-
diction because the statute is not included in the section designating cases 
over which federal jurisdiction is exclusive); see also BETH STEPHENS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 120–27 (2d ed. 
2008) (discussing state courts as a forum for human rights claims).  
 27. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 n.10 (2004) (stating that the statute “has been 
slightly modified on a number of occasions”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 
A124 (1947) (noting that “[c]hanges were made in phraseology”). 
 28. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25 (explicating the statute’s scope in relation to 
piracy, safe conducts, and diplomatic injuries). 
 29. An April 26, 2011, Westlaw search for federal case citations to the stat-
ute in the nearly 200-year period before 1980 yielded twenty-two results. West-
law search of “ALLFEDS” database using terms: [“28 u.s.c. § 1350” & da(bef 
1980)] on April 26, 2011. 
 30. Complaint ¶ 4, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(No. 79 Civ. 917), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/diana/13june.asp. 
 31. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
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case.32 Although it indicated that analyzing ATS jurisdiction 
required “a more searching preliminary review of the merits,”33 
the court held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action for tor-
ture as a violation of universally recognized norms of custom-
ary international law.34 
Following this watershed decision, the ATS received much 
more judicial attention than at any time in its history.35 An im-
portant follow-up decision came four years later in Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic.36 A three-judge panel on the D.C. Cir-
cuit agreed that the district court had properly dismissed the 
claim by a group of aliens for torture and other tortious con-
duct, but each judge wrote separately, unable to agree with 
each other’s reasoning.37 Judge Edwards, in a widely regarded 
opinion,38 approved of the Filártiga interpretation of the ATS 
but distinguished the instant case on the facts.39 Judge Bork, 
on the other hand, found the ATS to be solely jurisdictional in 
nature such that “there [must] be an explicit grant of a cause of 
action” for federal courts to be available.40 In the shortest of the 
three opinions, Judge Robb argued that the case presented a 
nonjusticiable political question.41  
The Edwards-Bork debate signified the division of the ma-
jor competing views of the ATS across the federal judiciary and 
legal academy in the following years. Under the view generally 
accepted following Filártiga, the ATS not only provided subject-
matter jurisdiction but also provided a cause of action for viola-
 
 32. Id. at 887 n.22 (deciding specifically to rest federal subject-matter ju-
risdiction on the ATS rather than the federal question provision of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (1993)). 
 33. Id. at 887. 
 34. Id. at 884 (using “customary international law” and “law of nations” 
synonymously); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same). 
 35. Compare supra note 29 and accompanying text (using a search for 
cases in the nearly 200-year period before 1980 to return twenty-two cases), 
with a Westlaw search of “ALLFEDS” database using terms: [“28 u.s.c. § 1350” 
& da(aft 1980)] on April 26, 2011 (using the same search for cases in the thir-
ty-year period after 1980 to return 633 cases). 
 36. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
 37. Id. at 775. 
 38. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (citing 
Judge Edwards’s opinion with approval). 
 39. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 40. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). 
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tions of the law of nations.42 Under the Borkian perspective,43 
the ATS would be a simple jurisdictional statute with no force 
unless Congress took further action to provide a statutory 
cause of action.44 Most courts, however, largely were not per-
suaded by Judge Bork’s attack on Filártiga and continued to 
hear and decide cases under the ATS.45 Over twenty years lat-
er, the Supreme Court responded to Judge Edwards’s request 
in Tel-Oren for guidance46 by endorsing his opinion and the 
Filártiga court’s use of this statute to hold modern human 
rights violators accountable in Sosa.47 
2. Sosa’s Historical Paradigm Test 
Hearing a claim by a Mexican doctor that his arrest and 
detention by U.S. citizens and law enforcement officials had 
been arbitrary, the Court found that the ATS provides a limited 
grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over federal common-law 
causes of action.48 Weighing in on the broader debate, the Court 
held that the ATS was “only jurisdictional,”49 while finding that 
this jurisdictional grant incorporated causes of action compara-
 
 42. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–10, Sosa, 
542 U.S.692 (No. 96-1890) (collecting cases); see also Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2383–88 (1991) 
(discussing the grounds for implying a right of action under the ATS). 
 43. See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (referring favorably to Judge Bork’s approach in an opinion by future 
Justice Scalia and with future Justice Ginsburg filing a separate concurrence); 
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118 (WHP), 2005 WL 1870811, at *1 n.1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005), rev’d, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 873 & 
n.357 (1997). 
 44. Congress did just that with respect to torture and extrajudicial kil-
lings in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 
Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). Yet the legislative history in both 
the Senate and the House shows a clear endorsement of the Filártiga view of the 
ATS. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 86 (1991). 
Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) supple-
ment to the ATS to repudiate, rather than validate, Judge Bork’s opinion. Id. 
 45. See Coliver, Green & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 224–26; Julian Ku, 
The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 359 & nn.35–36 
(2011) (stating that “Bork’s separation of powers critique never gained sub-
stantial currency outside the D.C. Circuit”). 
 46. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring) (“This case deals 
with an area of the law that cries out for clarification by the Supreme Court.”). 
 47. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 48. Id. at 712. 
 49. Id. 
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ble to those recognized at common law at the time of the 1789 
enactment of the ATS.50 Thus, for a modern claim to be cogniz-
able under the “law of nations” clause of the ATS, the Court 
held that it must rest on an international norm that is univer-
sal and specifically defined.51 
In defining this “historical paradigm test”52 for ATS juris-
diction, the court carved out a moderate position between the 
two sides’ arguments. Dr. Alvarez-Machain presented the broad 
view that the ATS simultaneously granted jurisdiction and con-
ferred a new cause of action for violations of the law of na-
tions.53 Yet, while the Court would not take this more expan-
sive view, it dismissed the Borkian restrictive interpretation, 
which would leave the ATS a dead letter.54 In this case, the 
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over this plaintiff ’s 
claim.55 Yet the Court provided the standard for recognizing 
new causes of action for norms having no “less definite content 
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical par-
adigms familiar when § 1350 [the ATS] was enacted.”56 Thus 
the Court validated the cautious discretion employed by lower 
courts to recognize other causes of action as international hu-
man rights norm evolve.57 
The Sosa Court provided that the ATS is a federal jurisdic-
tional statute incorporating existent international law.58 It is 
 
 50. Id. at 724 (giving as examples “Blackstone’s three primary offenses: vi-
olation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”). 
 51. Id. at 725 (“[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the 
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character ac-
cepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”). 
 52. Paul Hoffman & Adrienne Quarry, The Alien Tort Statute: An Intro-
duction for Civil Rights Lawyers, 2 L.A. PUB. INT. L.J. 129, 140 (2010), available 
at http://www.lapilj.org/uploads/1/7/9/9/1799330/hoffman_-_converted.pdf (coin-
ing this term for Sosa’s analysis). 
 53. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713. 
 54. Id. at 719 (rejecting the view that “the ATS is a jurisdictional conven-
ience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature”). 
 55. Id. at 738 (refusing to find a violation in “a single illegal detention of 
less than a day”). 
 56. Id. at 732. The Court cited with approval the standards enunciated in 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980), Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), 
and In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 
1475 (9th Cir. 1994). See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
 57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 58. Id. at 724 (“In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creat-
ing no new causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical mate-
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not an unadorned, and thus “stillborn,” jurisdictional statute,59 
but it does not automatically include all violations of customary 
international law.60 What this jurisdictional statute does in-
clude is the common law of international torts at the time of its 
enactment in the 1789 Judiciary Act.61 This definition of an 
ATS norm under the historical paradigm test incorporates the 
substantive norm, or cause of action, from international law 
but looks to federal common law to determine whether there is 
relief from the defendant’s specific conduct—that is, whether 
there is a remedy.62 The Court’s decision clarified, to a great 
degree, the role of international human rights norms in the 
ATS and the discretion of lower courts to develop federal com-
mon law in this “interstitial area[] of particular federal inter-
est.”63 However, courts have not always been clear about the 
procedural distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and 
stating a claim for relief in the ATS context—an issue to which 
this Note now turns. 
3. ATS Jurisdiction and Stating an ATS Claim for Relief 
The jurisdiction-merits distinction is fundamental in fed-
eral civil procedure.64 It is found in the organization of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.65 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dis-
 
rials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it 
became law.”). 
 59. Id. at 714 (referring to Sosa’s arguments). 
 60. Id. at 713 (noting Alvarez-Machain’s view of the ATS). 
 61. Id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been 
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of 
action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential 
for personal liability at the time.”). 
 62. One commentator argues that a cause of action under Sosa is a “hy-
brid” or “mixed” cause of action since it at once relies on international law and 
federal common law. William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort 
Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 638–44 
(2006). 
 63. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 
U.S. 715, 726–27 (1979)). 
 64. Although using the term “merits” to stand in for “stating a claim upon 
which relief may be granted” elides important distinctions in those concepts, 
such distinctions are not key to my analysis, which instead focuses on the dis-
tinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and stating a claim. For ease in 
this Note, I refer to a jurisdiction-merits distinction where the Supreme Court 
has employed the phrase “the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-
for-relief dichotomy.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006). 
 65. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring “a short and plain state-
ment of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”), and FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) 
(providing the defense of “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”), with FED. 
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miss on jurisdictional grounds is “analytically different” from a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.66 
Wright and Miller describe the former as “flexible, often serv-
ing as a procedural vehicle for raising various residual de-
fenses,”67 but failure to state a claim is not among such de-
fenses.68 The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has 
upheld and reiterated this distinction.69 Further, the Steel 
Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment rule requires 
that subject-matter jurisdictional issues be determined fully be-
fore considering a claim’s merit.70 In the ATS context, commen-
tators have highlighted the need for courts to rigorously police 
this distinction for analytical soundness.71 
In spite of this general view, courts hearing motions to 
dismiss ATS cases often are unclear about which of the two mo-
tions they are considering.72 Some courts review the motion 
 
R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief ”), and FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing 
the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). 
 66. E.g., 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350, at 106 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he former deter-
mines whether the plaintiff has a right to be in the particular court and the lat-
ter is an adjudication as to whether a cognizable legal claim has been stated.”). 
 67. See id. § 1350 passim (listing the defenses of mootness, political ques-
tion, and others). 
 68. See id. §§ 1355–1357 (discussing separately the Rule 12(b)(6) motion).  
 69. 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“It is firmly established in our cases that the 
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate 
subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.”); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“Jurisdiction, 
therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility 
that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners 
could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper 
cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for 
want of jurisdiction.”). 
 70. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
506, 514 (1869)); see also Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 
95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1214–16 (2001) (considering the Court’s “jurisdiction-
first” rule, but noting some exceptions).  
 71. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 26, at 29–31 (disputing Filártiga’s 
statement that ATS cases require “more searching preliminary review of the 
merits” at the jurisdictional stage based on the jurisdiction-merits distinction); 
see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 
TULSA L. REV. 579, 580–84 (2007) (discussing the conflation of jurisdiction and 
merits under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) “arising-under” jurisdiction). 
 72. Even the Sosa Court never explicitly stated whether it was dismissing 
the claims based on lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim for relief. 
See Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (ana-
lyzing Sosa). 
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strictly on jurisdictional grounds,73 while others discuss it in 
terms of stating a claim,74 and still others discuss jurisdiction 
as a function of the claim stated.75 Additionally, courts general-
ly do not appear to be mindful of this distinction or whether it 
matters to their analysis.76 Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., an opinion 
from the Southern District of Indiana, stands in contrast be-
cause it directly addressed this issue, adequately balancing the 
necessities of general procedural doctrine with the dictates of 
Sosa in ATS context.77 
In Bridgestone Corp., the court confronted allegations of 
forced labor of both adults and children on a Liberian rubber 
plantation.78 In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court enunciated the 
historical paradigm test and noted that plaintiffs need only al-
lege “colorable and arguable” violations—rather than a com-
pletely proven violation—of the law of nations to sustain sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction.79 The court further emphasized the 
jurisdiction-merits distinction by rejecting defendants’ attempt 
to incorporate a “higher standard” for ATS jurisdiction from the 
Filártiga and Kadic v. Karadzic cases.80 The court rightly fol-
 
 73. See, e.g., In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1301 (S.D. 
Fla. 2006) (dismissing for failure to state a claim). 
 74. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 
2009) (affirming the lower court, which had dismissed the complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim, but characterizing the dismissal as jurisdictional); Wiwa 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dis-
tinguishing between a jurisdictional challenge and merits-related questions 
that are irrelevant at the jurisdictional stage). 
 75. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(stating that the district court had dismissed the case “based on its determina-
tion that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to state 
claims under the ATS”); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 
309–10 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korma, J., concurring); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 
414 F.3d 233, 255 n.30 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 76. But see, e.g., Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 588 F. 
Supp. 2d 375, 379 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that whether the motion is on 
jurisdiction or failure to state a claim is a “very substantial issue,” but declin-
ing to distinguish which type it is because the parties “skirted” the issue). 
 77. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1006. 
 78. Id. at 990. 
 79. Id. at 1004; cf. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (stat-
ing that § 1331 arising-under jurisdiction requires a plaintiff to plead “a color-
able claim” for relief (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–85 (1946))). 
 80. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1004–05 (“[I]t is not a sufficient 
basis for jurisdiction to plead merely a colorable violation of the law of nations. 
There is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act unless 
the complaint adequately pleads a violation of the law of nations (or treaty of the 
United States).” (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995))). 
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lowed those courts that do not conflate jurisdiction and stating 
a claim, and it acknowledged that a heightened pleading stand-
ard at the jurisdictional stage is not acceptable after Sosa.81  
One final note on ATS jurisdiction relates to the two types 
of challenges on motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Some pre-Sosa courts distinguished between facial 
and factual motions to challenge a claim on jurisdictional 
grounds.82 A facial challenge is a direct challenge to the legal 
sufficiency of the claim.83 In such a motion, a court accepts as 
true all the allegations of the complaint and considers only that 
which is contained within the four corners of the complaint.84 A 
defendant who challenges the jurisdictional allegations them-
selves presents a factual challenge.85 In such a case, a court 
will not consider the complaint presumptively truthful but will 
weigh the defendant’s evidence against the allegations of the 
plaintiff, who has the burden of proving jurisdiction.86 Under a 
factual challenge, courts look to extrinsic evidence to determine 
whether the jurisdictional facts present a case that the courts 
have the power to adjudicate.87 Although a Rule 12(b)(1) facial 
attack and a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the claim have similar 
procedural requirements,88 this similarity does not dictate the 
wholesale importation of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard into the 
 
 81. Id. at 1005–06; see also Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 
2d 674, 686–87 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing the Bridgestone Corp. case and follow-
ing this approach to distinguish the jurisdiction issue from the pleadings is-
sue); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 
289, 307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (questioning the higher standard of review). 
 82. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1129–30 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (distinguishing the two types of challenges to subject-matter juris-
diction); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437–38 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(making the same distinction between factual and facial attacks of subject-
matter jurisdiction). The Eleventh Circuit has also recently taken the same ap-
proach. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 83. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 n.30 (2d Cir. 
2003) (allowing consideration of materials outside of the pleadings when ad-
dressing a factual challenge); Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1129; see also 
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 26, at 452 (discussing the role of factual material 
in pleading ATS cases). 
 88. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“As it does when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a 
court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts 
all well-pled facts alleged in the complaint as true.”). 
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Rule 12(b)(1) context. A court credits as true the complaint’s al-
legations in a facial attack because it is limited to those aver-
ments, and the plaintiff ’s burden in proving jurisdiction is mit-
igated by the presumption of truthfulness of the plaintiff ’s 
allegations. Beyond these superficial similarities, the analytical 
difference between jurisdiction and merits requires that the 
standards of review remain distinct,89 a point to which this 
Note will return later. 
In sum, courts are not always clear whether they are ex-
amining a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1), which requires the complaint to satisfy the historical 
paradigm test of Sosa, or a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which has an entirely different stand-
ard of review. That standard of review derives from Twombly 
and Iqbal and is considered in the next section on pleading 
standards. A general understanding of plausibility pleading al-
lows for an analysis of these specific pleading issues as they 
impact ATS lawsuits. 
B. FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS: FROM 1938 TO THE 
PRESENT 
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of Rule 8’s 
pleading requirements in Rule 12 motion practice has impor-
tant implications on ATS litigation. The simplified, notice 
pleading standard governing all civil claims since the inception 
of the Federal Rules is no longer current. The duo of Twombly 
and Iqbal repudiated that standard by creating a more strin-
gent test of a complaint’s sufficiency in stating a claim for re-
lief, which may be fatal to a number of valid claims.90 This sec-
tion discusses the development of federal pleading standards in 
order to provide background for an analysis of pleading re-
quirements in human rights claims under the ATS. 
Prior to 1938, litigation in the United States proceeded un-
der a system of code pleading.91 To bring a claim before the 
courts, a claimant had to list the “dry, naked, actual facts” of 
her case in a prescribed pattern, carefully avoiding any refer-
 
 89. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Brief of National Civil Rights Organizations, supra note 19, at 10–
11 (citing examples of how even plaintiffs with valid claims may find it nearly 
impossible to survive the Iqbal pleading standard). 
 91. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 
987, 990 (2003); see also CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 22 (2d ed. 1947). 
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ence to laws or legal standards.92 Elaborate rules developed, 
based on the assumption “that statements of fact and conclu-
sions of law could be sharply distinguished.”93 Being “widely 
criticized for overemphasizing form over substance,”94 the legal 
realist critique of the early twentieth century ended this formal-
istic method of pleading.95 In its stead, a simplified and liberal 
model of pleadings allowed greater access to the courts.96 
The Supreme Court promulgated these simplified pleading 
requirements,97 which came to be known as “notice pleading,”98 
at Rule 8(a)(2) of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.99 
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to provide “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”100 The rule mentioned neither facts nor law and, thus, 
reflected a policy decision that required very little of the claim-
ant to open the doors to the federal courthouse.101 This uniform 
pleading model had four distinct functions,102 of which the pri-
mary function was notice, according to the Supreme Court in 
 
 92. Bone, supra note 12, at 863 (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE 
REMEDIES 560–61 (4th ed. 1904)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Fairman, supra note 91, at 990. 
 95. One realist scholar, for example, found “no logical difference between 
permissible factual allegations and impermissible legal conclusions.” Bone, 
supra note 12, at 864 (citing Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in 
Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921)). 
 96. See Fairman, supra note 91, at 990 (noting how the adoption of the 
federal rules ensured that litigants would “have their day in court” and created a 
“new procedural system that massively de-emphasize[d] the role of pleadings”). 
 97. The Rules Enabling Act vests this authority in the Court. See Rules 
Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074 (2006)). 
 98. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434 
(2008). 
 99. Another rule, 9(b), heightens the pleading standard for fraud and mis-
take by requiring a party to state such allegations “with particularity.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 9(b). Application of this rule is generally not problematic, see Clermont 
& Yeazell, supra note 18, at 854 (referring to “seventy years of [judicial] inter-
pretation of the ‘particularity’ requirement”), and it is not at issue in this Note. 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 101. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of 
Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875–76 (2009) (discussing the policy argu-
ments underlying pleading standards). 
 102. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 87 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the four 
functions of pleading as providing notice to the parties, giving some facts, nar-
rowing the issues for litigation, and quickly and easily disposing of sham 
claims or defenses). 
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Conley v. Gibson.103 A complaint was only dismissed on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts” to support a claim for relief.104 The 
Conley notice pleading regime, arising from the liberal policy 
choice of the federal rules, lasted for fifty years. 
Before the Court’s major overhaul of this precedent in 
2007, the Court had two occasions to consider the role in the 
federal system of “heightened” pleading standards.105 First, in 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coor-
dination Unit, the Court acknowledged the competing policy 
arguments of plaintiffs, who seek a broad right of access to 
courts, and official defendants, who desire protection from suits 
that may be distracting or harmful to the public interest.106 It 
ultimately stated that summary judgment and controlled dis-
covery must supply the requisite protections unless the federal 
rules are amended to rebalance the policy goals.107 Next, in 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Court found that the simple 
allegations in petitioner’s claim were sufficient under “Rule 
8(a)’s simplified notice pleading standard,” and again deferred 
any statement on the defendant’s policy arguments to the es-
tablished rules amendment process.108  
In this fairly settled area of the law,109 the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Twombly abrogated a single phrase of the 
Conley decision,110 overruled no precedent,111 and purported not 
 
 103. 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (requiring the complaint to give “fair notice” of 
the claim to allow a defendant to prepare an adequate defense). 
 104. Id. at 45–46. 
 105. See generally Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1293 (2010) (discussing the cases analyzing pleading standards leading 
up to Twombly). 
 106. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166–68 (1993). 
 107. Id. at 168. 
 108. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–15 (2002). 
 109. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (describing the majority’s holding as a “dramatic departure from 
settled procedural law”). 
 110. Id. at 562–63 (majority opinion) (giving “Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ lan-
guage” its “retirement”); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007) 
(discussing Rule 8(a)(2)’s “liberal pleading standard” and citing with approval 
Conley’s “fair notice” requirement, indicating that the remainder of the Conley 
decision remains intact). 
 111. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547 (noting that the Court’s current analy-
sis “does not run counter to Swierkiewicz”). 
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to heighten pleading standards.112 The plaintiff based his 
Sherman Act113 allegations on evidence of “parallel conduct,”114 
which could have occurred by coincidence rather than illicit 
agreement.115 Announcing a new rubric of “plausibility,”116 the 
Court required that a claim present “enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”117 In 
light of the potentially massive expense of discovery to defend-
ants,118 the Court held that a claim must do more than give fair 
notice and leave “open the possibility that a plaintiff might lat-
er establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts.’”119 A complaint 
must rise “above the speculative level”120 and make a factual 
“‘showing’” of the grounds for relief.121 Finding that “the plain-
tiffs here [had] not nudged their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible,” the Court dismissed the claim.122 
Following Twombly, courts and commentators attempted 
to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision with the federal rules 
and the precedent interpreting them.123 The main question in 
this interim period was whether the plausibility standard 
would be limited to antitrust claims,124 be limited to cases that 
 
 112. Id. at 569 n.14 (“In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any 
‘heightened’ pleading standard . . . .”). 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 114. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
 115. Id. at 557. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 556. 
 118. Id. at 558. 
 119. Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 
45 (1957)). 
 120. Id. at 555. 
 121. Id. at 556 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 122. Id. at 570. 
 123. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting 
“a universal standard of heightened fact pleading” despite receiving “conflict-
ing signals” from the Supreme Court, and instead favoring “a flexible ‘plausi-
bility standard’”), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Al-
lan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Fed-
eral Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 604–06 (2006) (discussing various 
pleading standards following Twombly’s holding); A. Benjamin Spencer, Un-
derstanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (attempting to 
create a holistic theory of pleading). 
 124. See Bone, supra note 101, at 882–90 (discussing the “modest” impact 
of the decision). 
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bore structural similarities to antitrust claims,125 or apply to 
every civil suit.126 The answer came shortly thereafter in Iqbal: 
“plausibility” is inherent in Rule 8(a)(2)’s “showing” require-
ment and thus applies to “‘all civil actions’” under the Rules.127 
The plaintiff Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was ar-
rested for immigration infractions soon after the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.128 Federal law enforcement officials classified 
him as “of high interest” and moved him and many others so 
designated to a special detention center where he underwent 
unnecessary and degrading treatment on account of his race or 
religion in violation of his constitutional rights.129 The Supreme 
Court upheld the dismissal of his complaint against John Ash-
croft and Robert Mueller, which alleged that they had designed 
and implemented the policy that led to these violations.130 The 
Court explained the “two working principles” of pleadings from 
Twombly: (1) a court must accept all “factual allegations” as 
true, but need not credit “legal conclusions,” and (2) only a 
“plausible” claim for relief is sufficient to withstand a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim.131 Operating under those 
principles, the Court used a two-pronged analysis to determine 
the sufficiency of the claim. First, the allegations that were not 
entitled to a presumption of truth (the “legal conclusions”) were 
excised from the statement of the claim.132 Here, the Court de-
termined the allegation that the policy of detaining Muslims 
and Arabs such as Mr. Iqbal indicated a discriminatory intent 
on account of race or religion was a legal conclusion because it 
was “nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’” 
of the claim.133 Second, the remaining factual allegations were 
reviewed to determine whether they “plausibly suggest an en-
titlement to relief.”134 Because the Court had eliminated the 
key allegation of discriminatory intent, the Court deemed the 
 
 125. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to 
Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
61, 99 (2007) (finding Twombly’s holding useful in a small subset of cases). 
 126. See Spencer, supra note 20, at 103 (analyzing the effects of Twombly 
on civil rights litigation). 
 127. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 128. Id. at 1942. 
 129. Id. at 1943–44. 
 130. Id. at 1944. 
 131. Id. at 1949–50. 
 132. Id. at 1951. 
 133. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
 134. Id. 
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blue-penciled complaint insufficient and dismissed the case 
against these two defendants.135  
The Supreme Court’s requirements for pleadings drastical-
ly changed in appearance in a short period of time. Although 
the Court purported to make minimal changes in response to 
important policy issues, the ramifications of its holdings on a 
vast array of substantive areas of law remain to be seen. Mov-
ing into the arena of human rights litigation, these develop-
ments have begun to impact the arguments of litigants and de-
cisions of courts on plausibly pleading claims for human rights 
violations. The next Part reviews this impact by discussing the 
role of the plausibility standard in ATS cases across federal ju-
risdictions. 
II.  PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING IN THE ATS CONTEXT:NEW 
STANDARD OR NEW TERMINOLOGY?   
Many scholars have emphasized the radical or revolution-
ary nature of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions in the previous-
ly settled area of pleading practices.136 The publication of ar-
ticles about how to plausibly plead certain legal doctrines or 
claims is further indication that scholars believe the introduc-
tion of a pleading standard based on plausibility has changed 
the previous requirements necessary to make a case.137 Empir-
icists also are publishing evaluations of the meaning and effect 
of plausibility pleading on various areas of the law.138 This Part 
considers the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on federal courts’ 
analyses of motions to dismiss ATS claims. A review of these 
human rights cases to which district and circuit courts have 
applied a plausibility analysis reveals the beginnings of trends 
 
 135. Id. at 1952. The Supreme Court remanded to the Second Circuit, id. at 
1954, which then remanded to the district court to determine whether respond-
ent can “seek leave to amend his deficient complaint.” Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 574 
F.3d 820, 821 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 136. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 18, at 823 (“The Court has 
revolutionized the law of pleading . . . . [T]hey have destabilized the entire sys-
tem of civil litigation.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 
82 TEMP. L. REV. 627 (2009); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employ-
ment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011). 
 138. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly 
and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556–57 (2010) (finding 
statistically significant increases in dismissals on Rule 12(b)(6) motions follow-
ing Twombly and Iqbal, especially in constitutional civil rights cases). For an 
early, nonempirical but comprehensive survey of pleadings in civil rights 
claims following Twombly, see generally Spencer, supra note 20. 
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in application.139 One generally applicable trend is clear. In 
most courts’ boilerplate exposition of the legal standard on a 
motion to dismiss, quotations from Twombly and Iqbal have 
replaced most references to Conley.140 Whether the new incan-
tations in ATS suits represent a paradigm shift in pleadings141 
or simply new terminology for a gradual trend142 is the focus of 
this analysis. 
This Part proceeds in three sections. The first focuses on 
the role of plausibility pleading in the courts of the Second Cir-
cuit, the circuit that first dealt with both Twombly143 and Iq-
bal.144 The second section focuses on the Eleventh Circuit’s 
method and those courts that have followed it. The comparison 
of these two methods will show that plausibility pleading is nei-
ther consistently applied nor as detrimental to human rights 
litigation as it could be, except in a few initial cases from the 
Eleventh Circuit. The third section discusses various types of 
factual allegations and their relationship to the standard re-
quired by Twombly-Iqbal. This Part shows that the Twombly-
Iqbal standard should apply only to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, and not to Rule 12(b)(1) mo-
tions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts 
 
 139. To show the scope of this analysis, a Westlaw search of ALLFEDS for 
[“alien tort” & iqbal OR twombly] on April 26, 2011 yielded eighty results, not 
all of which actually applied the pleading standards to human rights claims. 
Note that these numbers are merely contextual and not empirical analysis. 
 140. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (citing to the language of Twombly and Iqbal in setting forth the 
standard of review for motion to dismiss decisions); id. at 191 (Leval, J., con-
curring) (echoing, again, the Twombly and Iqbal standards). Before Twombly’s 
2007 decision, 65 cases out of 382 ATS cases cited Conley. The number of ATS 
cases citing Conley drops to only 8 out of 225 after 2007. Compare Westlaw 
searches of ALLFEDS for [“conley v. gibson” & “alien tort” & da(bef 2007)] and 
[“alien tort” & da(bef 2007)] on April 26, 2011 (finding that 65 out of 382 ATS 
cases cited Conley), with Westlaw searches of ALLFEDS for [“conley v. gibson” 
& “alien tort” & da(aft 2007)] and [“alien tort” & da(aft 2007)] on April 26, 
2011 (finding 8 out of 225 ATS cases cited Conley). 
 141. See JOSHUA CIVIN & DEBO P. ADEGBILE, RESTORING ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF IQBAL AND TWOMBLY ON THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Civin%20and% 
20Adegbile%20issue%20brief%20final%20(9-14-10).pdf (urging legislative ac-
tion to reverse the “detrimental impact” of the pleadings decisions). 
 142. See generally Fairman, supra note 91 (describing the gradual progres-
sion of heightened pleading over the years). 
 143. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 144. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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must properly characterize motions to dismiss as challenging 
either subject-matter jurisdiction or the factual sufficiency of 
the claim so that they may apply Sosa to the former and 
Twombly-Iqbal to the latter. 
A. PLAUSIBILITY IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
The Second Circuit first breathed new life into the modern 
ATS with the 1980 Filártiga decision, and it continues to face 
many important issues regarding the ATS’s scope.145 Applying 
Sosa to novel factual scenarios, the Second Circuit and some 
district courts in the circuit recently have upheld claims recog-
nizing modern human rights violations as adequate under the 
historical paradigm test.146 Courts in this circuit have also been 
grappling with the relevance of the new pleading standard in 
analyzing disputed substantive issues such as aiding and abet-
ting liability and the state action requirement.147 This subpart 
focuses on those Second Circuit cases’ interpretation and appli-
cation of the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard. 
In hearing motions to dismiss ATS cases, courts in the 
Second Circuit now cite Twombly or Iqbal (or both) for the 
standard of review for a Rule12(b)(6) motion.148 Yet a closer 
look at these decisions reveals that the courts do not always 
implement Iqbal’s two-pronged approach of ignoring all “con-
clusory” allegations or legal conclusions and testing the remain-
ing factual allegations for sufficient plausibility.149 For exam-
ple, in Kiobel, Judge Leval’s concurrence began its review of the 
adequacy of the pleading of aiding and abetting liability for a 
variety of international norms by reciting the plausibility stand-
ard.150 Judge Leval then considered the general and the specific 
acts alleged in the complaint to constitute aiding and abetting, 
 
 145. See, e.g., Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (discussing the notion of corporate 
liability for international crimes). 
 146. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimentation is a 
“customary international law norm” sufficient to confer a cause of action under 
the ATS).  
 147. See, e.g., Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251(NG)(VVP), 2010 WL 
623636, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) (analyzing a motion to dismiss in the 
context of a claim of aiding and abetting terrorism by a bank); Almog v. Arab 
Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 271–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (following the exam-
ples of Sosa and Filártiga in deciding whether to recognize a claim under the 
ATS for aiding and abetting terrorism by a bank). 
 148. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123–24; id. at 191 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 149. See supra notes 131–36 and accompanying text. 
 150. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 191. 
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but he never applied the first prong to strike out any of the al-
legations or to find some worthy of the presumption of truth-
fulness and others unworthy.151 He did not move to an applica-
tion of prong two to consider the legal sufficiency of any 
remaining allegations that are presumed true. Rather, this 
concurrence presumed all of the general allegations and specific 
actions to be true but found they were “legally insufficient” for 
aiding and abetting liability “because they [did] not support a 
reasonable inference that Shell provided substantial assistance 
to the Nigerian government with a purpose to advance or facili-
tate the Nigerian government’s violations.”152 That reasoning is 
an application of the Second Circuit’s purpose standard for aid-
ing and abetting liability.153 The veneer of plausibility language 
does not make this a strict application of Iqbal. The concur-
rence stated that, by “[p]utting together these two rules [from 
Iqbal and Talisman],” the complaint must be dismissed.154 In 
this opinion, the application of the Talisman purpose rule was 
most dispositive while the Iqbal plausibility rule provided 
merely the framework. Judge Leval’s use of the Iqbal standard 
relied on his judicial “common sense,” rather than a rigid appli-
cation of that precedent’s steps.155 In Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, 
the district court took the same tack with respect to the plead-
ings to allow the claim of aiding and abetting terrorist attacks 
to proceed.156 The court quoted language from Iqbal on the 
plausibility standard and cited both Twombly and Iqbal,157 but 
it then credited all factual allegations as true and distinguished 
the case at bar from Talisman.158 Again, the Iqbal standard 
provided merely the terminology with which the court under-
took the Talisman legal analysis.  
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. represents a similar, but pre-Iqbal, 
analysis on the legal issue of the state action requirement.159 
The Second Circuit cited Twombly and its decision in Iqbal v. 
 
 151. Id. at 191–93. 
 152. Id. at 192. 
 153. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 
244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 154. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 154. 
 155. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
 156. Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251(NG)(VVP), 2010 WL 623636, 
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) (stating that Twombly and Iqbal “do not require 
the repeated incantation of key words” to survive a motion to dismiss). 
 157. Id. at *1. 
 158. Id. at *2–3. 
 159. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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Hasty for the plausibility standard of review.160 In the analysis, 
however, all allegations were presumed true and the majority 
found them adequate “[a]t the pleading stage.”161 The dissent 
took issue with one “conclusory” allegation, but the thrust of 
the dissent’s argument hinged on the legal issue of “consent” in 
the medical experiments and whether the alleged state actions 
satisfied the legal meaning of “decisive step” under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 jurisprudence.162 The debate between majority and dis-
sent focused more on whether the allegations satisfied the legal 
standard for state action than on whether to presume the alle-
gations were true or to remove them from the legal analysis of 
the claim’s sufficiency.163 Similarly, a 2008 district court deci-
sion quoted the Twombly pleading standard but decided the 
case on the mens rea element for aiding and abetting liabili-
ty.164 
Second Circuit cases, and those courts around the country 
that have followed suit, have retained a liberal view of pleading 
standards even within the rubric of the Twombly-Iqbal plausi-
bility standard.165 These courts have incorporated the lexicon of 
Twombly and Iqbal, and they are conversant in those prece-
dents and their “common sense” function.166 In spite of those 
decisions, however, these courts tend to analyze ATS claims 
and defenses on the more nuanced legal debates in the 
field167—for example, the purpose standard for aiding and abet-
ting liability or the state action requirement for certain inter-
national law violations. This may not be surprising since courts 
in this circuit first dealt with the Twombly and Iqbal cases and 
in light of the circuit’s decision in Iqbal v. Hasty, which more 
liberally applied Twombly than the Supreme Court did on those 
 
 160. Id. at 172 n.6. 
 161. Id. at 188–89. 
 162. Id. at 210–12 (Wesley, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 188–89 (majority opinion); id. at 211 (Wesley, J., dissenting); see 
also Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 97 Civ. 2858(BSJ), 2010 WL 3377503, at *7–8 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010); Estate of Manook v. Research Triangle Inst., Int’l, 
Nos. 5:10-CV-72-D, 5:10-CV-73-D, 2010 WL 3199874, at *3–4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 
12, 2010). 
 164. Mastafa v. Austl. Wheat Bd. Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 7955(GEL), 2008 WL 
4378443, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008). 
 165. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 681–82 
(S.D. Tex. 2009). 
 166. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
 167. See, e.g., Adhikari, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 685–88. 
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facts.168 Although the language of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has 
changed, the courts remain focused on the broader ATS ques-
tions in the circuit. 
In addition to the more liberal view of Twombly-Iqbal, the 
Second Circuit’s motion analyses have been clear about the dif-
ference in type and standard of view between Rule 12(b)(1) mo-
tions and Rule 12(b)(6) motions. In cases such as Kiobel, the 
Second Circuit neither conflated jurisdiction and stating a 
claim, nor applied a more stringent standard of review.169 The 
court, like many post-Iqbal courts, used boilerplate language 
from Twombly and Iqbal rather than Conley to provide the new 
terminology of the standard.170 Yet their application of plausi-
bility is not a heightening of the requirements at the motion to 
dismiss stage. The Second Circuit has incorporated the Su-
preme Court’s pleading standard in a limited and focused man-
ner. These courts have applied it appropriately to only Rule 
12(b)(6) motions and have discussed it usefully in the context of 
the broader substantive questions at issue.171 As the next sub-
part reveals, the courts of the Eleventh Circuit have not fol-
lowed this focused approach to plausibility pleading in human 
rights cases. 
B. PLAUSIBILITY IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
As the preceding section shows, the plausibility standard 
has yet to make waves in the Second Circuit. A few recent cases 
in the Eleventh Circuit, however, reveal more noticeable effects 
of Twombly and Iqbal. Unlike the Second Circuit, the Eleventh 
Circuit had some tendency toward a heightening of pleading 
requirements in the ATS. Whether these initial cases reflect a 
broader ongoing trend is not clear.172 Yet, some cases in the cir-
cuit have implemented the plausibility decisions in a manner 
 
 168. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. 
 169. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124–25 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
 170. See id. at 123–24; id. at 191–93 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 171. See Rosaleen T. O’Gara, Note, Procedural Dismissals Under the Alien 
Tort Statute, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 797, 820–22 (2010) (arguing that courts should 
tackle substantive issues directly instead of dismissing ATS cases on proce-
dural grounds). 
 172. But see Estate of Amergi ex rel. Amergi v. Palestinian Authority, 611 
F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2010), for an Eleventh Circuit decision that properly re-
viewed a jurisdictional motion to dismiss an ATS claim without reference 
to Iqbal. 
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that heightens the pleading standard without being explicit 
about this goal or approach.  
The leading Eleventh Circuit decision applying a plausibil-
ity standard of review to ATS claims is Sinaltrainal v. Coca-
Cola Co.173 The court described its standard of review in the 
terms of Twombly and Iqbal,174 and it stated that a Rule 
12(b)(1) facial challenge to jurisdiction has the same safeguards 
and standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to the sufficiency of 
the claim.175 The court, then, moved to the two-pronged analy-
sis of Iqbal and rejected those allegations in the complaint it 
found “conclusory” or implausible.176 With constant reference to 
plausibility, the court rejected plaintiffs’ allegations of state ac-
tion, of conspiracy, of torture, and of war crimes.177 With little 
left in the complaint to construe favorably to the plaintiffs,178 
the court dismissed the ATS and TVPA claims.179 In so doing, 
the court made precise, if inaccurate, decisions regarding juris-
diction and stating a claim for relief. The court applied the 
same Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility analysis to both ATS and TVPA 
claims.180 Yet, it characterized the ATS dismissal as one for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the TVPA dismissal as a 
failure to state a plausible claim for relief.181 
To understand this development in the Eleventh Circuit, 
the broader context of ATS motion practice in its courts is in-
structive. In the district court’s pre-Twombly decision in Sinal-
trainal, the court faced “difficult” questions of law and fact.182 
In determining ATS jurisdiction and whether the complaint 
stated a claim, the court conflated the jurisdiction and suffi-
 
 173. 578 F.3d 1252, 1260–61, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009).  
 174. Id. at 1260–61, 1265 n.14 (avoiding explicitly the issue of a “height-
ened pleading standard”). 
 175. Id. at 1260. 
 176. Id. at 1266–68. But cf. Michael Eaton, Note, The Key to the Courthouse 
Door: The Effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 
51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 321–23 (2011) (arguing that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not adequately apply the first prong of the Iqbal analysis and simply 
jumped to the second prong). 
 177. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1266–68. 
 178. See id. at 1260. 
 179. Id. at 1269–70. 
 180. Compare id. at 1266–69 (ATS claims), with id. at 1269–70 (TVPA claims). 
 181. Id. at 1270. 
 182. In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2006), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 
F.3d 1252. 
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ciency of the claim.183 It then proceeded to apply an explicitly 
“heightened pleading standard” to the issue of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.184 The court applied a heightened Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard to a jurisdictional issue in the ATS and TVPA—erring 
as to both the type of motion and the standard of review. 
In spite of the Supreme Court disfavoring heightened 
pleading standards,185 the Eleventh circuit, like a number of 
courts, has used a heightened standard in some contexts.186 
The Sinaltrainal district court examined and relied on the Elev-
enth Circuit’s decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Produce, Inc. to 
disregard “conclusory” allegations.187 Notably, the Aldana deci-
sion, which validated this rejection of conclusory allegations, 
does not consider its approach to pleading to be heightened.188 
While the district court in Aldana,189 just like the district court 
in Sinaltrainal,190 had taken a heightened approach to pleading 
requirements, the Eleventh Circuit refused to consider this ap-
proach heightened in either case.191 The Eleventh Circuit ap-
plied Iqbal in its move toward stricter pleading standards in 
this particular ATS case.192 
These developments contrast with ATS cases in the Second 
Circuit, where plausibility pleading has had relatively minimal 
impact on the disposition of motions to dismiss.193 The Eleventh 
Circuit has relied heavily on Twombly and Iqbal to analyze mo-
tions to dismiss ATS cases.194 Commentators lamenting the 
 
 183. Id. at 1284 (“Arguably, the distinction between the 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6) standards may be somewhat blurred in the context of an ATCA case.”). 
 184. Id. at 1286–87 (“[I]t is appropriate to require some heightened plead-
ing standard when determining whether the complaints in the instant cases 
sufficiently plead facts showing that Defendants violated the law of nations.”). 
 185. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007). 
 186. See Fairman, supra note 91, at 1059. 
 187. In re Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 (citing Aldana v. Del 
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 188. See Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1253. 
 189. Villeda Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 
1285, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Aldana v. 
Del. Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 190. In re Sinaltrainal, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1287. 
 191. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1265 n.14 (11th Cir. 
2009); Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1253 (stating that “some minimal pleading stand-
ard does still exist”). 
 192. A number of courts have followed this model. See, e.g., In re XE Servs. 
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 589 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 193. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 191–93 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
 194. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1260–61. 
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harsh effects on plaintiffs of plausibility pleadings195 need not 
look further than the Eleventh Circuit’s ATS decisions. Howev-
er, a review of the substantive law that the Eleventh Circuit 
has applied in the ATS context may explain this divergence 
from the Second Circuit.  
On a number of ATS issues,196 the Eleventh Circuit stand-
ards are more favorable to plaintiffs than those of the Second 
Circuit. Apparently, the strictness of pleading requirements is 
inversely related to the strictness of substantive legal require-
ments for bringing an ATS case. That is, the use of strict plead-
ing requirements ratchets up the difficulty in bringing an ATS 
case where the substantive legal requirements are more per-
missive (Eleventh Circuit), whereas a more stringent legal 
standard on the substantive issues obviates the necessity of 
heightened pleading requirements (Second Circuit). Further, 
this reliance on procedural mechanisms to dismiss hard cases 
gives an unwarranted reason to sidestep the pressing substan-
tive issues in ATS litigation today.197 In addition to ignoring 
Sosa’s delegation of discretion to the lower federal courts, this 
Eleventh Circuit method highlights many courts’ misunder-
standings about ATS jurisdiction and stating an ATS claim. 
As exemplified by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Sinal-
trainal,198 many courts make two fundamental errors when 
considering plausibility pleading in human rights cases. The 
first is to conflate the question of jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1) with that of the sufficiency of a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6).199 The second follows from the first: courts apply the 
standard of review of the latter in analyzing the former.200 The 
courts of the Eleventh Circuit directly reviewed the tough ques-
tion of ATS jurisdiction,201 unlike the many courts which have 
glossed over the issue.202 However, the conclusion by the circuit 
 
 195. See, e.g., CIVIN & ADEGBILE, supra note 141, at 1. 
 196. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1263 (allowing corporate liability); 
Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005) (requiring a 
mens rea of knowledge, not purpose, for aiding and abetting liability). 
 197. O’Gara, supra note 171, at 820. 
 198. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1268–69. 
 199. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 200. See, e.g., In re Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1301 (S.D. 
Fla. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 578 F.3d 1252. 
 201. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1266; In re Sinaltrainal, 474 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1275. 
 202. See, e.g., Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 588 F. Supp. 
2d 375, 378–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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court that “fail[ing] to state a plausible claim for relief” sup-
ports dismissal “for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”203 
misses the point of Sosa. As the Bridgestone opinion made 
clear, conflating these two analytically distinct issues is not a 
sound method to determine the viability of an ATS claim.204 
The power to speak the law of a particular issue is not the same 
as whether a particular set of facts implicates the need for a 
remedy under specified legal rights. The former necessarily 
precedes the latter, and a federal court cannot consider the lat-
ter if the former is lacking.205 Further, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
factual-facial distinction does not compel its result. Although 
the procedural assurances of a facial challenge to jurisdiction 
bear some similarities to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, that fact alone 
does not open the door to a review of the merits of a claim at 
the jurisdictional stage.206 
Contrary to the view of the Sinaltrainal court, Sosa did not 
conflate jurisdiction and merits in devising the historical para-
digm test.207 To determine ATS jurisdiction, it did not require a 
plausible claim under the law of nations; it demanded that the 
expression of the law of nations on a violation be “specific, uni-
versal, and obligatory.”208 This legal question precedes the de-
termination that a fact scenario plausibly implicates that in-
ternational norm. Thus, to the extent that Iqbal’s plausibility 
analysis applies in ATS suits, it does not apply to jurisdictional 
motions to dismiss an ATS—or any other—suit.209 
 
 203. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d at 1269.  
 204. See Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1004–06 (S.D. 
Ind. 2007). 
 205. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). 
 206. See id.; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1945). 
 207. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
 208. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 209. One district court went so far as to cite, then disregard, Iqbal in the 
ATS context, stating that “[n]othing in Iqbal suggests that the pleading stand-
ard it articulates applies to ATCA claims.” Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F. 
Supp. 2d 1004, 1021 n.44 (C.D. Cal. 2009). An initial reaction to the court’s 
discussion is that it missed Iqbal’s point on its transsubstantive application. 
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 
but then stating that Twombly “applies to antitrust and discrimination suits 
alike”); Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: De-
fining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 506 (2009) (“[T]he plausibility stand-
ard is a transsubstantive pleading standard applicable to all claims brought in 
federal court.”). On closer examination, however, the court’s result (although it 
gives no reasoning) is supportable because Iqbal is not “transprocedural”—
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C. THE APPLICABILITY OF TWOMBLY-IQBAL IN ATS CASES 
The diversity of application of plausibility pleading, espe-
cially in the Eleventh and Second Circuits, indicates the need 
for reflection on the meaning of this pleading standard in hu-
man rights litigation. After establishing ATS jurisdiction under 
Sosa’s historical paradigms test, a claim must have the facial 
plausibility that Twombly-Iqbal requires to withstand a Rule 
12(b)(6) challenge. To flesh out the narrow scope of the plausi-
bility standard, this section discusses the nature of factual al-
legations that are permissible under Twombly-Iqbal. 
A court must accept as true “all well-pleaded, nonconclu-
sory factual allegations in the complaint.”210 Accepting these 
facts, judges must rely on their “experience and common sense” 
to decide whether the complaint is plausible.211 Under Twom-
bly-Iqbal, courts must determine what facts are sufficiently 
nonconclusory and whether those facts present a plausible 
claim for relief.212 One type of fact entitled to the presumption 
of truthfulness is one alleged upon information and belief.213 
The Sinaltrainal court reacted with some hostility to certain 
allegations that the plaintiffs had made “on information and 
belief.”214 Finding that they did not allow for a “reasonable in-
ference” of liability, the Eleventh Circuit struck out those alle-
gations.215 The Second Circuit recently has clarified that the 
simple fact that an allegation is based on the plaintiff ’s infor-
mation and belief does not make it suspect.216 Rather, facts al-
leged on information and belief may be credited when either 
“the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of 
 
that is, its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis does not apply to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See 
S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 567 (2010) (stating that the Supreme Court has not 
extended the Twombly-Iqbal standard from Rule 8(a)(2) to Rule 8(a)(1), but 
arguing in favor of such a move); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 555 n.3 (2007) (relying on the term “showing” in Rule 8(a)(2), which is not 
present in Rule 8(a)(1), for its holding). 
 210. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 211. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 212. Id.  
 213. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 24–26, Shan v. China Constr. Bank 
Corp., No. 10-2992 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2010), 2010 WL 4715538 (raising this ar-
gument and citing Second Circuit case law). 
 214. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). 
 215. Id.  
 216. See Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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the defendant”217 or “the belief is based on factual information 
that makes the inference of culpability plausible.”218 Further, 
even conclusory statements may survive Iqbal’s first prong 
when they are based on sufficient, even circumstantial, evi-
dence.219 In sum, the plausibility standard allows crediting al-
legations even when based on information in a defendants’ con-
trol, on belief when it is based on facts, and on circumstantial 
evidence—as long as the court may reasonably infer liability 
may be substantiated through discovery or at later stages of lit-
igation. 
Another type of factual allegation in ATS cases—those of 
conspiracy—tends to get particularized treatment under the 
plausibility standard.220 In cases alleging some form of conspir-
acy to commit human rights violations, courts often apply the 
analysis of Twombly by analogizing (or distinguishing) the facts 
in a given case.221 Plausible conspiracy, without any considera-
tion of Iqbal’s analysis, requires that the allegations demon-
strate more than parallel conduct and allow for the plausible 
inference that an agreement exists.222 The District of Mary-
land, in Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, found that the allegations of a 
conspiracy to commit acts of torture were sufficient because the 
facts allowed an inference of more than simple parallel conduct 
and the absence of an agreement was the more implausible de-
duction.223 The court viewed the facts most favorable to the 
plaintiff and allowed conspiracy to be proven by circumstantial 
evidence.224 To respond to defendants’ argument that the con-
spiracy allegations were “conclusory,” the court refused to 
 
 217. Id. (citing Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 218. Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). 
 219. See Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 767–68 (D. Md. 2010) 
(conspiracy claims). 
 220. See id.; see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 
2d 700, 703 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 221. See Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 729–31. But see Sinaltrainal v. Co-
ca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying the Iqbal analysis 
to all claims, including conspiracy claims). 
 222. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550–51, 564 (2007); cf. 
Amanda Sue Nichols, Note, Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability Cases: 
Should Courts Apply the Plausibility Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2207–08 (2008) (discussing the similari-
ties of antitrust and ATS accomplice liability suits, and arguing for the appli-
cation of Twombly in both cases). 
 223. Al-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 766–67. 
 224. Id. at 765. Interestingly, the court determined that the facts were suf-
ficient for both conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 766. 
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strike the conclusory statements because they were “‘supported 
by factual allegations.’”225 That is, conclusory statements pro-
vide a useful framework that specific allegations can flesh out. 
This special application of Twombly to conspiracy cases shows 
that courts may find the plausibility standard has greater rel-
evance to particular cases rather than “‘all civil actions.’”226 
Thus employed, the plausibility standard may serve the 
purpose of pleadings in our adversarial system. The standard 
ensures that, at the pleadings stage, courts can differentiate 
unmeritorious suits based on insufficient factual allegations 
and legitimate claims that arise from actual defendant culpa-
bility. The Second Circuit’s application of the Twombly-Iqbal 
standard, in contrast to that seen in the Eleventh Circuit’s ini-
tial cases, does that in a way that is true both to Sosa and to 
Twombly and Iqbal. Judge Leval’s “common sense” balance be-
tween the Iqbal methodology and the substantive ATS issues 
provides just such a model.227 When approaching the plausibili-
ty standard in human rights litigation, courts must apply the 
Twombly-Iqbal standard only to Rule 12(b)(6) motions and they 
must do so in a limited and focused way to balance the needs of 
plaintiffs and defendants in the early stages of civil litigation. 
This legal analysis is supported by the policy analysis the Su-
preme Court has undertaken in the pleadings and ATS realms, 
which is the focus of the next Part. 
III.  THE ROLE OF PLAUSIBILITY IN MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS   
This Part concludes that plausibility pleading has only a 
circumscribed role in human rights litigation under the ATS. 
Courts need not apply a heightened plausibility standard to is-
sues of ATS jurisdiction as the Eleventh Circuit and other 
courts have done.228 Not only does the foregoing analysis lead 
to this conclusion, but the substantial overlap of policy concerns 
in Twombly-Iqbal and Sosa decisions supports such an imple-
mentation of the standard. The practical effects and policy jus-
 
 225. Id. at 767 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)). 
 226. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
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tifications of Sosa are similar to those in Twombly-Iqbal. Thus, 
courts can rest assured that, by analyzing jurisdictional chal-
lenges under Sosa and merits challenges under Twombly-Iqbal, 
they adequately are balancing the needs of defendants and 
plaintiffs. To explicate this conclusion, this Part examines and 
compares the policy behind these recent decisions. 
The major policy concern behind Twombly was the proper 
role of discovery.229 While arguably the federal rules policy 
worked “not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep 
them in,”230 the Supreme Court justified its interpretation of 
Rule 8(a)(2) in Twombly because expensive and time-
consuming litigation should be weeded out at the earliest poss-
ible phase.231 The Court determined that discovery in an anti-
trust case can be unwieldy and too costly for defendants232 and 
that it was inefficient and unfair to defendants to allow a suit 
to move to the discovery stage on the basis of flimsy plead-
ings.233 The concern with unwieldy discovery is likewise 
present in ATS litigation, which may focus on events, people, 
and evidence spread across continents. The Sosa Court, while 
not addressing this concern directly, responds to it by setting a 
“high bar to new private causes of action.”234 Sosa’s standard is 
sufficiently strenuous to weed out unmeritorious claims with-
out also eliminating legitimate claims that will gain strength 
through discovery.235 
The Iqbal Court similarly was concerned with “unlock[ing] 
the doors of discovery.”236 In Iqbal, the Court’s emphasis on dis-
covery arose out of the specific arguments in the case.237 Be-
cause of the defendants’ claims to qualified immunity, the costs 
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 235. Consider the court’s disposition of a motion to dismiss in In re XE Ser-
vices Alien Tort Litigation, 665 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009): the court, in 
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of discovery went beyond monetary burdens.238 In addition to 
the discovery costs in time and money upon government offi-
cials, the defendants complained that the ex ante impediment 
of a threat of lawsuits might limit officials’ ability to complete 
their duties.239 The possibility that discovery might lead to re-
vealing sensitive executive branch information, especially re-
garding the U.S. government’s national security efforts in re-
sponse to the events of September 11, 2001, increased this 
concern.240 The Court announced its more stringent pleading 
standard in light of discovery concerns in antitrust litigation.241 
Yet the Court did not explicitly apply that heightened plausibil-
ity standard to “‘all civil actions’” until faced with a case con-
cerning the more sensitive area of national security, the sepa-
ration of powers between courts and the political branches, and 
judicial review of high-ranking executive branch officials’ ac-
tions.242 
The Iqbal Court’s policy concerns in a strict pleading stand-
ard overlapped greatly with the Sosa Court’s policy concerns in 
limiting actionable causes in ATS litigation. In “argu[ing] for 
great caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights,” 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion presented five major con-
cerns.243 These policy concerns focused on the role of federal 
common law post-Erie, the role of the legislature in the process 
of creating private rights of action, and, especially, the impact 
that ATS suits on foreign relations and executive power in that 
arena.244 The Court affirmed the position of the ATS in provid-
ing jurisdiction for certain causes of action in international law, 
but only after carefully weighing the sensitive concerns arising 
out of U.S. foreign relations, the separation of powers between 
the courts and the political branches, and the role of executive 
power operating in that area.245 The policies and the effects of 
Iqbal’s new heightened pleading standard, thus, are substan-
tially the same as those enunciated in the ATS context by Sosa. 
The Court’s standard for ATS jurisdiction in Sosa suffi-
ciently upped the ante in ATS suits to weed out meritless 
 
 238. See id. at 1953–54. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1953. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 243. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–28 (2004). 
 244. Id.  
 245. See id. at 728–31. 
  
2350 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:2318 
 
claims. While not requiring fact pleading, the standard’s re-
quirements presented a high bar for defining a cause of action 
at the jurisdictional stage. The Court justified this standard for 
ATS claims because of concerns with the federal judiciary’s role 
with respect to foreign relations and the expenses of interna-
tional human rights litigation.246 These policy justifications are 
closely tracked by the Court’s reasoning in Twombly and Iq-
bal.247 The Iqbal Court justified this new standard because of 
the serious policy implications of discovery regarding national 
security issues and the work of executive branch officials in 
responding to crises.248 Thus, these two sets of precedents, 
when properly applied in their respective procedural arenas, 
can protect defendants from costly and meritless litigation 
while allowing plaintiffs the free and easy access to courts that 
our justice system promises.  
  CONCLUSION   
When Twombly came down in 2007, commentators and lit-
igants alike questioned the meaning and scope of this decision. 
The Supreme Court largely answered those questions in Iqbal 
two years later. Now as the legal profession and the legal acad-
emy try to respond to the new decisions on plausibility stand-
ards, this Note has attempted a fill the gap in the literature 
concerning the effects of the new standard on human rights lit-
igation under the ATS. This analysis of pleading standards in 
motions to dismiss reveals that courts are not only unclear 
about what Twombly-Iqbal means for ATS cases, but that 
courts still struggle with the appropriate application of Sosa to 
pleading ATS cases. Thus, this Note clarifies the historical par-
adigm test of ATS subject-matter jurisdiction under Sosa and 
highlights the proper approach to plausibility pleading follow-
ing Twombly-Iqbal. Properly understanding the legal distinc-
tion between those two concepts as well as the policy considera-
tions animating these two lines of cases indicates that 
plausibility does not and need not have a huge impact in ATS 
litigation. Instead of fulfilling the prophecy that plausibility 
will irreparably damage litigants’ access to justice, courts 
should apply a narrowly tailored version of the plausibility 
pleading standard in Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss ATS 
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claims to balance the needs of plaintiffs and defendants in hold-
ing human rights violators accountable. 
